Entangled Embodiments

In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty dedicates many pages to the analysis of pathological cases, which seem to be assessed as merely negative phenomena that reinforce an extrinsic opposition with normal ones. This paper aims to clarify that Merleau-Ponty in effect challenges the able–disabled dichotomy by articulating an intentional analysis based on the perspective of being-in-the-world and proposing a differential understanding of embodiment. Such an analysis demonstrates that ability and disability exist as material and situational events and, simultaneously, form an existential continuum—one that rejects the identification of disability with a disruption (ontological claim) or a degradation (normative claim)

Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Disability Rights and Representation · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Posthumanist Ethics and Activism