The Role of the Cpsu Central Committee Advisers in the Realization of Economic Assistance to Afghanistan (1978–1988)
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21780852 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nikita Pivovarov (0000-0002-5225-7524, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 122-131 |
| Publication date | 2025-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ural Historical Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1728-9718 |
| Publisher | Institute of History and Archaeology of Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Science (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.30759/1728-9718-2025-2(87)-122-131 |
| OpenAlex | W4411739907 |
| Language | EN |
The article, based on archival documents, examines the role of advisers from the Central Committee of the CPSU in providing assistance in solving socio-economic problems in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in 1978–1988. The focus on economic issues is due to the fact that throughout the 1970s the USSR’s attention to all countries of the Global South was dictated by economic challenges and hopes for success in competition with capitalism. The author believes that an examination of the socialist experiment in Afghanistan most clearly demonstrates the successes and failures of both the Soviet and the entire world socialist system. The author consistently describes the peculiarities of the formation of the corps of party advisors, as well as their participation in the development and organization of land and water reform, the implementation of social projects, and the organization of the financial system of the republic. It is shown that despite the unstable military situation, the 1980–1983 period in the DRA was the most successful in economic terms. At the same time, the growing economic difficulties led to the winding down of the socialist experiment. The author identifies the following reasons why the advisors failed to fulfill the tasks assigned to them. First, the total dependence of the Afghan leadership on the advisers. Second, the lack of reliable information that would have allowed them to form an objective view of the situation in the country. Third, the lack of a common line of both the Soviet leadership and the advisers in the implementation of socio-economic reforms in the DRA. The last reason, in the author’s opinion, is the key one, since the advisors often changed strategic approaches in the economy under the influence of the military and socio-political situation
Business · Political science · Mathematics · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Public Administration
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |