Reframing Single- and Dual-Process Theories as Cognitive Models

Commentary on De Neys (2021)

Bibliographic Data

ID21786142
AuthorsAliya Rumana (0000-0002-4404-5193, University of Arizona, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume16
Issue6
Pages1428-1431
Publication date2021-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePerspectives on Psychological Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1745-6916 • E-ISSN: 1745-6924
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/1745691621997115
PMID34283666
OpenAlexW3186971561
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited19

De Neys (this issue) argues that the debate between single- and dual-process theorists of thought has become both empirically intractable and scientifically inconsequential. I argue that this is true only under the traditional framing of the debate—when single- and dual-process theories are understood as claims about whether thought processes share the same defining properties (e.g., making mathematical judgments) or have two different defining properties (e.g., making mathematical judgments autonomously versus via access to a central working memory capacity), respectively. But if single- and dual-process theories are understood in cognitive modeling terms as claims about whether thought processes function to implement one or two broad types of algorithms, respectively, then the debate becomes scientifically consequential and, presumably, empirically tractable. So, I argue, the correct response to the current state of the debate is not to abandon it, as De Neys suggests, but to reframe it as a debate about cognitive models

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive reframing · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Linguistics · Cognitive Science and Mapping · Complex Systems and Decision Making · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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