Making Sense of Complicity

Bibliographic Data

ID21787751
AuthorsMeradjuddin Khan Oidermaa (0000-0002-9533-004X, Stockholm University, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume21
Issue2
Publication date2026-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.70093
OpenAlexW7155611579
LanguageEN
References cited33

Philosophers increasingly invoke the concept of moral complicity across a wide range of domains in moral philosophy, political theory and applied ethics. Yet the literature remains deeply fragmented and difficult to make sense of. This article identifies three central axes of disagreement—over which cases count as complicity, what its normative upshot is and what grounds it. I argue that, although disputes about cases are relatively tractable, disagreements about upshot and ground remain deeply entrenched. I conclude by proposing that progress requires a framework of limited pluralism that integrates and refines insights from selected accounts of complicity. This framework helps make sense of the phenomenon that is complicity and provides a coherent structure within which the field can advance

Complicity · Normative · Phenomenon · Politics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification

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Open DOIOpen Access