In Vain or Virtue? Explaining Pesticide Reduction Ambitions in the EU Common Agricultural Policy National Strategic Plans
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21787786 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Polman (0000-0002-4570-2968, Wageningen University & Research, corresponding author), Pieter Zwaan (0000-0002-0953-5189, Radboud University Nijmegen), Gerry Alons (0000-0003-2169-5510, Radboud University Nijmegen) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Publication date | 2026-07-09 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Regulation & Governance (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1748-5983 • E-ISSN: 1748-5991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/rego.70188 |
| OpenAlex | W7167812506 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 31 |
The development of national strategic plans (NSPs) under the EU's common agricultural policy (CAP) involves considerable coordination between Member States and the (European) Commission. In this process, the Commission provides recommendations to each Member State before they submit their draft NSPs and observations at a later stage before Member States submit their final NSP. The Commission's assessment is based on the NSPs' contribution to the formal CAP's objectives, as well as the (not binding) EU Green Deal (EGD) objectives. Comparisons of NSPs show a wide variation in Member States' level of ambition regarding the EGD objectives, including targets for reducing pesticide use. This paper examines under which conditions Member States set high pesticide reduction targets or increase their targets during the process, and what the role of the Commission is in this process. Based on the existing literature on EU policy coordination, we expect that the extent to which Member States set ambitious targets for pesticide reduction and respond to the Commission's recommendations and observations depends on the perceived legitimacy of the Commission, the presence of Green parties in government, existing national pesticide use trends, and domestic power concentration. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis, we show that the Commission has a role here. Its recommendations can contribute to higher ambition in Member States, but always in combination with other conditions. We find four pathways that are associated with high levels of ambition and three pathways explaining an increase in ambition after the publication of draft NSPs. These findings provide new insights for the debate on the Commission's soft power in EU policy coordination
Commission · Common Agricultural Policy · European commission · European union · Legitimacy · Member state · Member states · Advanced Causal Inference Techniques · European Union Policy and Governance · Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |