Re-Assessing James
A Call to Action
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21790012 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jesse Prinz (0000-0001-6855-0023, The Graduate Center, CUNY, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 92-94 |
| Publication date | 2026-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Emotion Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1754-0739 • E-ISSN: 1754-0747 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/17540739261422956 |
| OpenAlex | W7130604813 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 6 |
Agnes Moors challenges William James’s theory of emotions on multiple grounds. She argues that: James wrongly commits to the view that emotions must have perceptual causes; he wrongly insists that all emotions are embodied, ignoring emotions such as hope and regret; he errs in treating bodily feeling as sufficient for emotions; he cannot account for the “heat” (valence and intensity) of emotions; and he fails to account for emotions’ intentionality. This commentary addresses each of these objections, while also agreeing with Moors that James’s theory needs to be updated. An imperatival theory of emotions is proposed and compared to Moors’ response evaluation theory
Call to action · Feeling · Moors · Perception · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |