Moral Identity, Moral Integration, and Autobiographical Narrative
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21823099 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Vanello (0000-0002-5688-4330, University of Southampton, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 29-46 |
| Publication date | 2025-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of Philosophy and Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1878-5158 • E-ISSN: 1878-5166 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s13164-023-00722-9 |
| OpenAlex | W4390612275 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 51 |
Moral identity theorists argue that moral action is explained by the centrality of moral values to a person’s identity. Moral identity theorists refer to moral integration as both the process by which moral values become central to a person’s identity and the state an individual is in when a given moral value is central to their identity. While moral identity theorists appeal to autobiographical narratives to determine the state of moral integration in an individual, they have little to say about the role of autobiographical narratives in articulating the process of moral integration. The aim of this paper is to argue that appealing to autobiographical narratives supports the view that moral integration is a learning process the outcome of which is the acquisition of an understanding of moral concepts that is exercised in moral deliberation. Since moral identity theorists argue that moral integration is empirically correlated to a sustained commitment to moral action, the upshot of the argument of this paper is an account that elucidates the relationship between moral identity, moral action and moral deliberation
Aesthetics · Deliberation · Epistemology · Moral authority · Moral development · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Narrative · Personal identity · Political science · Self · Social cognitive theory of morality · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Ethics in Business and Education · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Development
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences
Prosocial Behavior and Caring in Adolescence
Does Moral Identity Effectively Predict Moral Behavior?
Moral Identity
Autobiographical reasoning in life narratives buffers the effect of biographical disruptions on the sense of self-continuity
Universals in the Content and Structure of Values
Moral Development, Self, and Identity
The Moral Functioning of Mature Adults and the Possibility of Fair Moral Reasoning
Moral identity as a goal of moral action
Developing a Life Story
Developing Moral Agency through Narrative
What Develops in Moral Identities? A Critical Review
Identity
Moral Identity and Developmental Theory
Moral cognition and moral action
Four Dimensions of Self‐Defining Memories (Specificity, Meaning, Content, and Affect) and Their Relationships to Self‐Restraint, Distress, and Repressive Defensiveness
When Remembering Is Not Enough
Intergenerational Transmission of Values
Narrative Identity Processing of Difficult Life Experiences
Extraordinary Moral Commitment
Remembering Your (Im)Moral Past
From thought to behavior
Integrating self and experience in narrative as a route to adolescent identity construction
Autobiographical reasoning
The moral self
Bridging moral cognition and moral action
Young Adult Moral Exemplars
Adolescent Generativity
Developing Narrative Structure
Late Adolescent Identity Development
Reconciling the self and morality
Life's little (and big) lessons
Late adolescents' self-defining memories about relationships
Age-related differences in moral identity across adulthood
Shame and Necessity
The integration of agency and communion in moral personality
Interpreting the Good Life
Moral personality of brave and caring exemplars
Social Cognitive Theory
Getting a life
| Citations per year | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |