Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21823306 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Darryl Mathieson (0000-0003-2320-6370, Australian National University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 523-539 |
| Publication date | 2024-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of Philosophy and Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1878-5158 • E-ISSN: 1878-5166 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s13164-023-00680-2 |
| OpenAlex | W4321239986 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 34 |
In contemporary philosophy of mind and psychiatry, schizophrenic thought insertion is often used as a validating or invalidating counterexample in various theories about how we experience ourselves. Recent work has taken cases of thought insertion to provide an invalidating counterexample to the Humean denial of self-experience, arguing that deficiencies of agency in thought insertion suggest that we normally experience ourselves as the agent of our thoughts. In this paper, I argue that appealing to a breakdown in the sense of agency to explain thought insertion is problematic, and that rather than following the prevailing binary approach which holds that certain features of consciousness go missing while others remain wholly intact, a better explanation involves construing thought insertion as a disturbing or disrupting of the subjectivity (for-me-ness) of experience. The result is that experiencing ourselves as the subject of our thoughts is where future research should be directed, given the robust persistence of this form of self-experience across psychopathological and non-psychopathological cases alike
Consciousness · Counterexample · Denial · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Psychoanalysis · Self · Sense of agency · Subjectivity · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Pain Management and Placebo Effect · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments · Social Psychology
Thought Insertion without Thought
Self-disorders and first-person authority
Is conscious thought immune to error through misidentification
On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments
Thinking in schizophrenia and the social phenomenology of thought insertion
Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance
Making sense of the doxastic approach to thought insertion
Subjectivity and Selfhood
The Conscious Brain
Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and the Self
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry
The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays
Self-Experience Despite Self-Elusiveness
Mysticism and schizophrenia
Agency, authorship, and illusion
A model of the synchronic self
Self and Other
On the Observability of the Self
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |