Being Self in Heidegger’s Ontology

In contemporary ontology, the relationalist perspective succeeding Deleuze prevails regarding Difference itself as a selfgenerating and self-organizing dynamic against the old ontology of Being as infinitude.Focusing on the Difference itself that penetrates all becoming, this perspective fails to savor the differences between beings and the peculiarity of human existence.Thus, this new ontology is not for the individual as it seems.In this paper, I argue that the characteristic distinguishing Heidegger's thought from contemporary relationalism and presenting it as a new insight lies in contemplating the 'self' as temporal in its ecstatic and horizontal existence and, in this way, spontaneous, making possible an ontology of the individual that has hitherto been disregarded for universality.First, I outline that Heidegger's Being is not like the traditional one, and his deliberation of human existence.Next, I demonstrate that by demand of this Being, an individual exists as a self in the world, distinguished from the traditional subject arrested with self-identity.Then, I argue that the existence of a self in the world is temporal, and an individual's temporality implies 'spontaneity.'Finally, I explain how a self's temporal existence cannot be reduced to the work of Being itself

Aesthetics · Deliberation · Epistemology · Existential quantification · Existentialism · Fundamental ontology · Linguistics · Ontology · Political science · Self · Sociology · Temporality · Computer Science · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, and Politics · Psychotherapy Techniques and Applications · Artificial Intelligence

• Realism without Materialism

  Graham Harman•SubStance•2011

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