Epistemic Injustice, Paralysis, and Resistance

Using the vocabularies of epistemic injustice coined by Miranda Fricker, epistemic paralysis (my term for the incapacitation of the epistemic agent), and epistemic resistance developed by Jos Medina, I aim to sketch in this paper an epistemic liberatory project in philosophy that takes its cue from recent philosophical literature in feminist (but also decolonial and critical race) studies, which interrogates the fundamental role of social identity in knowledge formation. The central focus shall be the interrogation of the ways in which power relations between social identities create conditions of hermeneutical inequality and testimonial privileging and/or marginalization within the field of philosophy. Drawing from Linda Martn Alcoff's and Elizabeth Potter's development of feminist epistemology that no longer takes gender as a "'pure' or solitary influence" in the production, construction, and validation of knowledge, this paper, to use the words of Alcoff and Potter, hopes "not only to satisfy intellectual curiosity," but also to contribute to the emancipatory goal of "the expansion of democracy in the production of knowledge," with specific attention to the practice of academic philosophy. In this sense, the paper is feminist in its emancipatory goal; but it aims to liberate and empower not only 'women' in philosophy, but other (intersectional) social identities silenced by the privileged rhetoric of philosophical practice

Aesthetics · Episteme · Epistemology · Epistemology of Wikipedia · Feminist epistemology · Feminist philosophy · Injustice · Rhetoric · Social epistemology · Sociology · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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