Platform governance by competing systems of political economy

The United States and China

Bibliographic Data

ID21837544
AuthorsMilton Mueller (0000-0002-9114-8259, Georgia Institute of Technology, corresponding author), Yik Chan Chin (0000-0002-1362-7481, Beijing Normal University)
Year2022
Volume14
Issue2
Pages240-242
Publication date2022-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolicy & Internet (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1944-2866 • E-ISSN: 1944-2866
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1002/poi3.306
OpenAlexW4281955734
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited7

The United States and China have the two largest and most innovative internet economies, yet there are major differences between their political systems, businesses, foreign policies and approaches to international law. This special issue examines the way the governance of digital platforms characterizes two profoundly different systems of political economy. Some observers believe that the American and Chinese systems of political economy are incompatible, and can only conflict. Deciding whether that belief is true or not requires empirical comparative analysis. Scholars may find as many similarities as differences. When there are notable differences, scholarly research can help reveal why those differences exist and whether they really do lead to conflict. Digital platforms are information services that facilitate value-creating exchanges in what economists call multi-sided markets. In social media, e-commerce, ride sharing and cloud services, they have created large-scale multinational companies such as Google, Amazon, Didi, and Alibaba. Platform governance refers to the laws, regulations, business practices, and design decisions that influence or control platform's content, operations and market access. Typically, academic research in this area consists of Western scholars in the United States and Europe talking about China, or Chinese scholars in China talking about the United States. In an attempt to allow Western and Chinese scholars to conduct objective comparative analysis of each other's digital platform systems and interact with each other, the Georgia Institute of Technology's Internet Governance Project held a conference “Comparative Analysis of Platform Governance in the US and China” in June 2021. The papers published here were selected from that conference. The papers in this special issue cover platform governance from different angles: international trade and security, social media content, competition policy, privacy litigation, and the digitization of money. Trade and international relations are covered by two papers, one by Mueller and Farhat (2022), the other by Cai and Wang (2022). Mueller and Farhat (2022) conduct a sequential analysis of the rise of barriers to United States–China trade in information-communication technology and digital platform markets from 2000 to 2021. They find that both countries are following a policy of digital neo-mercantilism, in which domestic policy makers represent information flows and digital technologies as critical to the security and relative power of the state. As a result, they pursue various forms of industrial policy, data localization, trade protectionism or exclusion of foreigners. Similarly, Cai and Wang (2022) argue that the platform governance strategies of the two countries are actually more similar than they seem. Unlike Mueller and Farhat (2022), however, they view the departure from liberal globalization more positively, as an evolving “middle groas a more pragmatic and balanced approach to the historic turbulence of the United States–China relationship. Papers by Chin et al. (2022) and another by Liu and Yang (2022) focus on content governance. Chin et al. (2022) examine the regulation of false information on platforms. They show that Facebook's governance relies almost entirely on corporate self-regulation of the platform, users and external third parties, whereas Weibo's governance is much more complex, combining self-regulation, co-regulation, and external regulations. However, to increase transparency and accountability, both Facebook and Weibo have devolved certain governance powers and responsibilities to internal or external intermediaries. Chin et al. (2022) suggest that a balance between the three regulatory models is essential to improve its effectiveness, accountability and inclusiveness. Liu and Yang (2022) argue that China's platform governance mechanism focuses more on content governance, while the United States focuses more on technology governance. The Chinese system is dominated by the state and the United States by the market, forming the two mechanisms of “Statism with Content Regulation First” and “Marketism with Technology Governance First.” Huang and Meyer (2022) focus on the rise of digital currencies. They discuss the ways that digitization of money can challenge monetary sovereignty and the international monetary order, and explore the competition between China and the United States over and within the international monetary system. They conclude that emerging financial infrastructures and standards for digital currencies are the new technological arena for United States–China monetary competition. Dorwart (2022) takes a unique perspective on platform regulation, examining how it can happen from “the bottom up.” The paper conducts a comparative analysis of the ability of individuals in the United States and Chinese legal systems to affect platforms behavior through data protection litigation. Privacy and data protection laws in both countries grant individuals enforceable rights against other private and public actors. In both countries, individual litigants face barriers to shaping corporate privacy behavior by means of litigation, but there are major differences in the nature of the barriers. He (2022) provides a detailed examination of how the standard for exclusionary behavior by a platform might be changed. Drawing on Chinese cases related to the “choose one from two” challenges to Alibaba, and Douyin versus TenCent, she proposes a methodology for regulating platforms that are not proven to be dominant. All the papers are timely and significant given the dominance of U.S. and Chinese digital platforms, and the growing influence of platforms and internet governance upon politics, culture, business, and global network security

China · Corporate governance · Digital economy · Economics · Economy · Internet governance · Management · Multinational corporation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · The Internet · World Wide Web · Blockchain Technology Applications and Security · Computer Science · Digital Economy and Work Transformation · Digital Platforms and Economics · Law

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