Moral Rightness Comes in Degrees
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21876313 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Martin Peterson (0000-0003-0014-9684, Mitchell Institute, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 645-664 |
| Publication date | 2022-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the American Philosophical Association (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2053-4477 • E-ISSN: 2053-4485 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/apa.2021.36 |
| OpenAlex | W4221127838 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 12 |
This article questions the traditional view that moral rightness and wrongness are discrete predicates with sharp boundaries. I contend that moral rightness and wrongness come in degrees: Some acts are somewhat right and somewhat wrong. My argument is based on the assumption that meaning tracks use. If an overwhelming majority of competent language users frequently say that some acts are a bit right and a bit wrong, this indicates that rightness and wrongness are gradable concepts. To support the empirical part of the argument I use the tools of experimental philosophy. Results from three surveys ( n = 715, 578, and 182) indicate that respondents use right and wrong as gradable terms to approximately the same extent as color terms, meaning that rightness and wrongness come in degrees roughly as much as colors do. In the largest study, only 4 percent persistently used right and wrong as non-gradable terms
Epistemology · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |