The Deceiving Game

Bibliographic Data

ID21876375
AuthorsShlomo Cohen (0000-0002-9852-5221, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), Ro’i Zultan (0000-0002-4256-8601, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
Year2021
Volume7
Issue4
Pages453-473
Publication date2021-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the American Philosophical Association (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2053-4477 • E-ISSN: 2053-4485
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/apa.2020.33
OpenAlexW3195340139
LanguageEN
References cited32

The moral comparison of the three venues of deception—lying, falsely implicating, and nonverbal deception—is a central, ongoing debate in the ethics of deception. To date there has been no attempt to advance in the debate through experimental philosophy. Using methods of experimental economics, we devised a strategic game to test positions in the debate. Our article presents the experimental results and shows how philosophical analysis of the results allows drawing valid normative conclusions. Our conclusions testify against the dominant position in the debate—that lying is morally worse than all non-lying deceptions. They offer prima facie support to the view that the venue of deception makes no moral difference

Deception · Epistemology · Lying · Nonverbal communication · Normative · Prima facie · Communication · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Medicine · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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