Desire's Own Reasons

Bibliographic Data

ID21876434
AuthorsUku Tooming (0000-0002-4632-7979, Hokkaido University of Science, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume8
Issue2
Pages259-277
Publication date2022-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the American Philosophical Association (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2053-4477 • E-ISSN: 2053-4485
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/apa.2021.20
OpenAlexW4207080589
LanguageEN
References cited45

In this essay I ask if there are reasons that count in favor of having a desire in virtue of its attitudinal nature. I call those considerations desire's own reasons. I argue that desire's own reasons are considerations that explain why a desire meets its constitutive standard of correctness and that it meets this standard when its satisfaction would also be satisfactory to the subject who has it. Reasons that bear on subjective satisfaction are fit to regulate desires through experience and imagination because desires are naturally sensitive to them. I also analyze the limits of application that such reasons have and how desire's own reasons relate to other kinds of reasons

Aesthetics · Correctness · Epistemology · Sociology · Virtue · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology

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