Moral Progress Through Conceptual Improvements

A Typology and Its Philosophical Lessons

Bibliographic Data

ID21876500
AuthorsJinglin Zhou (0000-0003-3074-4329, Fudan University), Yu Yang (0000-0001-9283-0068, Fudan University)
Year2026
Volume12
Issue2
Pages201-216
Publication date2026-06-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the American Philosophical Association (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2053-4477 • E-ISSN: 2053-4485
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/apa.2025.10018
OpenAlexW7114909145
LanguageEN
References cited24

Conceptual improvements are a significant dimension through which local moral progress occurs, both at the individual and societal levels. Michele Moody-Adams (1999) offers a narrow view of moral progress, suggesting that only a deepened understanding of complex, existing moral concepts can constitute moral progress. Consequently, she views the role of moral philosophy as limited to constructing deeper accounts of these concepts. We broaden Moody-Adams’s (1999) account by identifying three distinct types of conceptual improvements that can constitute moral progress: deepening the understanding of existing concepts, creating new concepts, and enhancing the ability to apply concepts. We support this typology with historical examples where such improvements constituted moral progress. Based on this typology, we argue that the role of moral philosophy extends beyond developing and refining moral theories to include the active creation of new concepts and the facilitation of conceptual application

Moral development · Moral disengagement · Moral philosophy · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Social cognitive theory of morality · Typology · Ethics in Business and Education · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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