Der Erfahrungsbericht des 1. Deutschen Einsatzkontigentes Isaf

Following the parliamentary evaluation of Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan, Philipp Münch’s thesis of Germany’s lack of strategy has been confirmed. The commission of inquiry even referred to a »strategic failure.« Previous academic studies were primarily based on open sources, memoirs, and eyewitness accounts. This makes it all the more important to conduct a historical study of this costly Bundeswehr deployment in the Hindu Kush more than 20 years later. Since the current classified information instruction makes it difficult to use official documents, the few already declassified documents offer a starting point. One such key document is the field report of the 1 st German ISAF Contingent from 2002. Approximately 20 pages of text address both positive and negative experiences from the early days and formulate recommendations for future contingents. In his introduction, the author asks for the extent to which this strategic failure is already reflected in the first field report. This edited version of the report provides initial answers, but also touches on further topics that can be explored in the future using this and other sources

Commission · German · Software deployment · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · Military History and Strategy · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East