Research on the quality supervision strategy of drugs sold on the internet under the MAH system

Bibliographic Data

ID22073175
AuthorsZongliang Wen (Xuzhou Medical College, corresponding author), Jialin Chen (0000-0002-7519-0545, Xuzhou Medical College), Li Zhou (0000-0001-7132-5935, Xuzhou Medical College), Long Bai (0000-0003-2671-3298, Xuzhou Medical College), Shenqin Wu (Xuzhou Medical College), Yun Zhao (0000-0002-2323-2926, Xuzhou Medical College, corresponding author), Jinhua Fang (Xuzhou Medical College, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume13
Pages1457340-1457340
Publication date2025-04-09
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueFrontiers in Public Health (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2296-2565 • E-ISSN: 2296-2565
PublisherFrontiers Media SA (PUBLISHER • CH)
DOI10.3389/fpubh.2025.1457340
PMID40270721
OpenAlexW4409308680
LanguageEN
References cited34

Background: In recent years, purchasing medications online has become increasingly popular. However, occasional quality issues have arisen with drugs bought online. As a result, we need effective quality monitoring of medicines sold online. To address this issues, several countries have begun to implement the Marketing Authorization Holder (MAH) system to enhance drug quality control. Methods: Consequently, this paper develops a four-party evolutionary game model that includes the government, holder, agent seller and third-party platform in pharmaceutical online sales, and use Matlab 2022b to carry out numerical simulation, and to compare and analyze the influence of different factors on the strategy selection of the main body of the game by changing parameters. This paper is based on the multi-party game perspective, constructed a hierarchical model, thereby better exploring the mechanism of drug quality regulation in the context of drug online sales under the MAH system. Results: Findings suggest that reducing operational costs motivates agent sellers to adopt stable, honest strategies. Increased government penalties expedite the adoption of positive strategies by sellers, holders, and third-party platforms. Enhanced penalties from holders and platforms for defaults effectively regulate seller behavior. Additionally, reputation rewards or losses incentivize sellers to adopt honest practices, with consumer and sellers' reputations influencing the likelihood of comprehensive third-party platform reviews. Conclusions: In summary, policy makers should improve the regulatory mechanism, establish a fair system of rewards and penalties, develop a compensation mechanism for information sharing, deregulate prices and enhancing feedback channels

Business · Internet privacy · The Internet · World Wide Web · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Medicine · Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy · Pharmaceutical Quality and Counterfeiting