Pharmaceutical enterprises drug quality strategy Moran analysis considering government supervision and new media participation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22077935 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yanping Xu (0000-0002-0828-3573, Shandong Normal University), Lilong Zhu (0000-0002-9697-3012, Shandong Normal University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Pages | 1079232-1079232 |
| Publication date | 2023-01-17 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Frontiers in Public Health (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2296-2565 • E-ISSN: 2296-2565 |
| Publisher | Frontiers Media SA (PUBLISHER • CH) |
| DOI | 10.3389/fpubh.2022.1079232 |
| PMID | 36733287 |
| OpenAlex | W4316669219 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 28 |
The improvement of drug quality requires not only the supervision of government, but also the participation of new media. Therefore, this paper considers the impact of government regulation and new media reports on pharmaceutical enterprises, constructs a Moran Process evolutionary game model, and analyzes the evolution trajectory of pharmaceutical enterprises' choice of drug quality improvement strategy and drug cost reduction strategy. We obtain the conditions for the two strategies to achieve evolutionary stability under the dominance of external factors and the dominance of expected returns. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by the software MATLAB 2021b . The results show that, first of all, when the government penalty is high, the drug quality improvement strategy tends to become an evolutionary stable solution, increasing the penalty amount will help promote the improvement of drug quality. What's more, when the government penalty is low and the new media influence is low, the drug cost reduction strategy is easier to dominate. The higher the new media influence, the higher the probability that pharmaceutical enterprises choose the drug quality improvement strategy. Thirdly, when the number of pharmaceutical enterprises is lower than a threshold, the drug quality improvement strategy is easier to dominate. Finally, the drug quality improvement strategy is dominant when the quality cost factor is low and the government penalty is high, the drug cost reduction strategy is dominant when the quality cost factor is high and the government penalty is low. Above all, this paper provides countermeasures and suggestions for the drug quality improvement of pharmaceutical enterprises in practice
Business · Quality management · Chemistry · Computer Science · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Marketing
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |