Institutional Setting and Industrial Conflict in Quebec

Bibliographic Data

ID2209362
AuthorsMichael R Smith (0000-0001-7329-6031), Michael Smith (0000-0002-7649-353X, corresponding author)
Year1979
Volume85
Issue1
Pages109-134
Publication date1979-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Sociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0002-9602 • E-ISSN: 1537-5390
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/226976
OpenAlexW2081115323
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited11

In this paper, I criticized and refine Snyder's (1975, 1977) interpretation of the relationship between institutional setting and industrial conflict. I argue, among other things, that it is always rational for employees to strike when unemployment is low, irrespective of the attitudes of employers or the extent to which a government is favorable to labor and that, consequently, if an economic model of industrial conflict fails to "work," it makes sense to look at the institutional bases of calculative bahavior on the part of organized labor rather than at the attitudes of employers or the government. I illustrate this argument with data from postwar Quebec

Argument (complex analysis) · Economic growth · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Interpretation (philosophy) · Labour economics · Political science · Positive economics · Sociology · Unemployment · Work (physics) · Computer Science · Engineering · Labor Movements and Unions · Social Policy and Reform Studies · Social Sciences and Governance

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