As críticas de Leibniz à teoria da percepção de Descartes

This paper’s aim is to try to answer the critiques made by Leibniz against Descartes’ theory of perception. The first of these critiques concerns the so-called ‘idea-picture’. The answer to this critique will be given on the basis of the Cartesian theory of ‘causal dissimilarity’ between the object of perception and the sensations brought about by it. The second critique refers to the qualia, that is, the supposed disconnection and arbitrariness between the content of the mental representation (the idea) and its material reference. The answer to this critique will be given by means of the psychophysical correlation that Descartes calls ‘institution of nature’. Finally, the last critique relates to the insensibles perceptions. In order to answer this critique, it will be showed that Descartes held that matter is infinitely divisible and consequently he defended that there are many portions of bodies whose perception escapes the reach of our senses. Keywords: Theory of perception; Mechanism; Qualia; Institution of Nature

Epistemology · Humanities · Philosophy · Philosophy and Historical Thought · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology