Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology

Bibliographic Data

ID22109272
AuthorsNathan Rockwood (0000-0001-5781-9488, Brigham Young University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume10
Issue0
Publication date2024-02-27
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueErgo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2330-4014 • E-ISSN: 2330-4014
PublisherUniversity of Michigan Library (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.3998/ergo.5180
OpenAlexW4392201164
LanguageEN
References cited21

Do Descartes, Locke, and Hume have an internalist or externalist view of epistemic justification? Internalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by a mental state, such as the awareness of evidence. By contrast, externalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by facts about the belief-forming process, such as the reliability of the belief-forming process. I argue that they all think that the awareness of evidence is required for justification, but none of them think that the awareness of evidence alone is sufficient for justification. Similarly, I argue that they all think that reliability of the belief-forming process is required for justification, but none of them think reliability alone is sufficient for justification. So, neither a fully internalist position nor a fully externalist position adequately captures their views of justification; rather, both the supporting evidence and the reliability of the belief-forming process explain why we should hold those beliefs, and hence explain why those beliefs are justified. Thus, they each have a partly internalist, partly externalist view of justification

Epistemology · Externalism · Internalism and externalism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

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