Subjective Facts about Consciousness

Bibliographic Data

ID22109294
AuthorsMartin A Lipman (0000-0003-3493-9107, Leiden University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume10
Issue0
Publication date2023-11-17
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueErgo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2330-4014 • E-ISSN: 2330-4014
PublisherUniversity of Michigan Library (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.3998/ergo.4649
OpenAlexW4388753351
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited30

The starting point of this paper is the thought that the phenomenal appearances that accompany mental states are somehow only there, or only real, from the standpoint of the subject of those mental states. The world differs across subjects in terms of which appearances obtain. Not only are subjects standpoints across which the world varies, subjects are standpoints that we can moreover ‘adopt’ in our own theorizing about the world (or stand back from). The picture that is suggested by these claims has an appeal but is at the same time obscure and stands in need of regimentation. This paper explores and motivates a metaphysical account of what it is for subjects to be standpoints, what it is to adopt standpoints in our representations and, most importantly, how these notions might help us better understand the subjective character of conscious mental states. Some well-known observations by Thomas Nagel serve as starting points and the paper concludes by revisiting Nagel’s argument for the inevitable incompleteness of objective accounts of mental states, which will be reframed in terms of the central commitments of the proposed framework

Appeal · Consciousness · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Political science · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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