Experience and Definitions in the Hobbes-Bramhall Debate on Liberty

In his exchanges with Bramhall on liberty, Hobbes provides an argument for his understanding of liberty, a “proof” from experience, which appears to be obviously flawed. According to Bramhall, Hobbes is making a basic mistake: he’s assuming that what’s in our minds serves as a legitimate basis for a conclusion about liberty. But close attention to the exchanges related to this argument shows this assessment to be too hasty, because despite first appearances, the dispute between Hobbes and Bramhall regarding this argument is not really about experience. Instead, the dispute amounts to a deeper disagreement about the nature of definitions, how we acquire them, and how we should use them. I argue that when we interpret Hobbes as holding that the definitions of the terms in the debate, such as ‘liberty,’ need no demonstration because they are “explications of our simplest conceptions,” his argument from experience makes better sense and reveals, even in its main points of contention, the coherence of the argument with his most fundamental philosophical commitments regarding method, materialism, and language

Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

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