One “True” Meaning

Bibliographic Data

ID22109456
AuthorsPoppy Mankowitz (0000-0003-1308-1041, University of Bristol, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume11
Issue0
Publication date2024-10-30
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueErgo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2330-4014 • E-ISSN: 2330-4014
PublisherUniversity of Michigan Library (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.3998/ergo.6783
OpenAlexW4403915887
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited52

Some words express different meanings in different contexts, such as “bank” and “I.” Linguistic alethic pluralists claim that “true” is another such word. This is a surprising thesis that holds implications for debates about the nature of truth. Yet it is in need of careful elaboration and evaluation. I describe several versions of linguistic alethic pluralism, alongside tests that natural language theorists use to identify different types of meaning variation. I also consider empirical studies that have recently targeted the use of “true.” I conclude that there is currently no evidence for linguistic alethic pluralism, and unlikely to be any forthcoming

Epistemology · Linguistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation

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