Aristotle and Contemporary Theories of Luck

Bibliographic Data

ID22133813
AuthorsMarcella Linn (0000-0001-8433-710X, Loyola University Chicago, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume10
Issue4
Pages83
Publication date2025-07-23
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2409-9287 • E-ISSN: 2409-9287
PublisherMDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.3390/philosophies10040083
OpenAlexW4412595362
LanguageEN
References cited33

Contemporary theories of luck face problems when it comes to moral luck, that is, luck that nevertheless partially determines moral responsibility. Either they conceive of luck as chancy or modally fragile, which is too narrow and excludes cases such as choosing to do something that is unlikely for you to do or that you do not do in many nearby possible worlds. Others see luck as primarily a matter of lack of control, which is too broad and includes things like the sun’s rising, which is outside of our control, but certainly not a matter of luck. Some try to rescue the moral luck phenomenon by positing hybrid accounts or denying that moral luck is a species of luck. Very little has been written about how Aristotle’s conceptions of luck fit into modern conceptions. Yet, Aristotle has sophisticated accounts of luck and good fortune that shed light on certain problems. I will show how Aristotle fares compared to contemporary theories and what we can learn from his approach to luck and fortune when it comes to how lack of control, modal robustness, and probability factor into luck, the difference between luck and good fortune, and whether moral luck is a species of luck

Epistemology · Luck · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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