Meaning and Reference in Programming Languages
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22134250 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nicola Angius (0000-0002-7209-4400, University of Messina, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 40 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2409-9287 • E-ISSN: 2409-9287 |
| Publisher | MDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT) |
| DOI | 10.3390/philosophies10020040 |
| OpenAlex | W4409091167 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 39 |
This paper provides an analysis of the meaning–reference problem, as traditionally advanced in the philosophy of language, for imperative programming languages. Addressing the problem is relevant for the philosophy of computer science in the context of the debate of whether simulative programs can be considered representational theories of their simulated systems. This paper challenges the thesis that, since programming languages have semantics, they also have reference, presumably to the external world. First, denotational, operational, game theoretic, and axiomatic semantics are epistemologically analysed to provide a theory of meaning for high-level language programs. It is argued that programming language semantics can be seen, to some extent, under the light of Fregean descriptivism, thereby rejecting the view that it is reference that determines meaning. Secondly, descriptivist, causal, character, and intentionalist theories of reference are examined to argue that meaning is not sufficient for programming languages to determine reference, thereby rejecting the view that meaning determines reference. It is argued that it is the intentions of agents that allow programming language semantics to identify referents. The paper concludes that if the semantics of programming languages may determine their reference, the latter is not to the external world but to the internal operations of the implementation executing them. This does not prevent simulative programs from representing empirical systems, but they do so not on the basis of programming language semantics
Cognitive science · Epistemology · Linguistics · Artificial Intelligence in Games · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · Logic, programming, and type systems · Philosophy · Psychology
Philosophy of Language
Computation and Cognition
Iii.—on Referring
Naming and Necessity
On the Morality of Artificial Agents
Précis of The Intentional Stance
Putnam's paradox
Ii.—on Denoting
Words
The Rule-Following Paradox and its Implications for Metaphysics
The Problem of Justification of Empirical Hypotheses in Software Testing
About the “Trinity Thesis” Regarding the Ontology of Computer Programs
On the Mutual Dependence Between Formal Methods and Empirical Testing in Program Verification
What an Algorithm Is
The Indexical Character of Names
On malfunctioning software
General semantics
Proper names and identifying descriptions
Meaning
Reference and Definite Descriptions
Three Myths of Computer Science
New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |