Practical Wisdom, Extended Rationality, and Human Agency

Datos Bibliográficos

ID22134356
AutoresJohn Hacker-Wright (0000-0002-2463-3369, University of Guelph, autor de correspondencia)
Año2023
Volumen8
Número2
Páginas39
Fecha de publicación2023-04-16
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2409-9287 • E-ISSN: 2409-9287
EditorialMDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.3390/philosophies8020039
OpenAlexW4366090632
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas14

This paper defends a neo-Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom as a virtue that enables human agents to reflect on and direct their lives toward virtuous ends over time. This view is sometimes assumed to require a commitment to an intellectualist Grand End or blueprint view. On that view, practical wisdom would require philosophical insight and an implausibly well worked out set of weighted preferences. In this paper, I aim to show that particularists can and should take on much of what was thought to belong to the Grand End view. I argue for a conception of practical wisdom as a virtue of extended action that accounts for overarching ends without the need to appeal to an unrealistic, intellectualized blueprint for life. Further, on the view advocated here, as in Aristotle, practical wisdom is a virtue of substantial rationality and a different capacity from instrumental rationality in that it requires reflection on what constitutes a good human life. This is not high-minded philosophical reflection and is, in fact, something rather mundane that draws on the same rational capacities we deploy to assess the goodness of actions

Appeal · Blueprint · Epistemology · Political science · Practical wisdom · Rationality · Sociology · Virtue · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy