Induction, Experimentation and Causation in the Social Sciences

Bibliographic Data

ID22134397
AuthorsLars-Göran Johansson (0000-0003-4116-7061, Uppsala University, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume6
Issue4
Pages105
Publication date2021-12-16
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2409-9287 • E-ISSN: 2409-9287
PublisherMDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.3390/philosophies6040105
OpenAlexW4200315798
LanguageEN
References cited23

Inductive thinking is a universal human habit; we generalise from our experiences the best we can. The induction problem is to identify which observed regularities provide reasonable justification for inductive conclusions. In the natural sciences, we can often use strict laws in making successful inferences about unobserved states of affairs. In the social sciences, by contrast, we have no strict laws, only regularities which most often are conditioned on ceteris paribus clauses. This makes it much more difficult to make reliable inferences in the social sciences. In particular, we want knowledge about general causal relations in order to be able to determine what to do in order to achieve a certain state of affairs. Knowledge about causal relations that are also valid in the future requires experiments or so called ‘natural experiments’. Only knowledge derived from such experiences enable us to draw reasonably reliable inferences about how to act in order to achieve our goals

Causal inference · Causation · Ceteris paribus · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Inductive reasoning · Sociology · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access