The Sufficiency of Spinozistic Attributes for their Finite Modes

Bibliographic Data

ID22147905
AuthorsMichael Anthony Istvan (0000-0002-8675-4510, Austin Community College, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume4
Issue1
Pages133-155
Publication date2021-07-31
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSíntesis Revista de Filosofía (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2452-4476 • E-ISSN: 2452-4476
PublisherUniversidad Adolfo Ibanez (PUBLISHER • CL)
DOI10.15691/24524476vol4iss1a350
OpenAlexW4392424114
LanguageEN
References cited9

Some passages throughout Spinoza’s body of works suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature provides a sufficient condition for all of its modes, including the finite ones. Other passages suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature fails to provide a sufficient condition for its finite modes. My aim is to dispel this apparent tension. I argue that all finite modes are ultimately entailed by the absolute nature of their attribute. Furthermore, I explain how the Spinozistic positions that appear incompatible with this view are in fact compatible. As I see it, we should read those passages where Spinoza says that no finite mode ultimately follows from the absolute nature of its attribute as saying merely that no finite mode ultimately follows in one-by-one fashion, independent of an infinite series of other modes, from the absolute nature of its attribute

Epistemology · Finite set · Mathematical analysis · Pure mathematics · Computer Science · Historical Linguistics and Language Studies · Marxism and Critical Theory · Mathematics · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Rousseau and Enlightenment Thought · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

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