The economics of water conflict
Transaction costs, bargaining failure, and sustainable cooperation in the Nile dispute
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22203998 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alex Atanasov (0000-0001-9388-4834, Applied Science University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 13 |
| Pages | 102074 |
| Publication date | 2026-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Sciences & Humanities Open (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2590-2911 • E-ISSN: 2590-2911 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.ssaho.2025.102074 |
| OpenAlex | W7119038043 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) epitomizes the intractable nature of transboundary water conflicts, where technical solutions exist yet negotiations remain deadlocked. This study investigates this paradox by applying transaction cost economics and bargaining theory framework to the Nile dispute. I argue that bargaining failures and sustained conflict are not due to a lack of mutually beneficial solutions, but rather are driven by prohibitively high transaction costs. These costs arise from legal ambiguity, asymmetric information, weak enforcement mechanisms, and strategic interference by external actors. By integrating the theories of Coase, Shavell, and Miller with comparative hydropolitics, this analysis extends transaction cost theory into the realm of international water governance. The paper makes a dual contribution: theoretically, it provides a systematic model for diagnosing negotiation barriers in hydropolitics; practically, it proposes a policy framework to lower transaction costs through mechanisms for credible information-sharing, structured negotiations, and renewable energy integration. The findings demonstrate that coupling institutional reforms with investments in sustainable technology, such as regional energy grids and solar infrastructure, can transform zero-sum conflicts into positive-sum cooperation. This case illustrates that sustainability is not merely an ecological goal but is a critical tool for overcoming political deadlock and achieving efficient, stable bargains over shared resources. The paper outlines a policy framework that proposes short-term measures and long-term institutional integration. While these pathways offer a roadmap for cooperation, the analysis soberly acknowledges their significant political and operational feasibility constraints, highlighting the inherent limitations of theoretical models in overcoming deeply entrenched geopolitical disputes
Enforcement · Institutional analysis · Institutional theory · Internalization theory · Multinational corporation · Negotiation · New institutional economics · Sustainability · Sustainable development · Transaction cost · International Maritime Law Issues · Transboundary Water Resource Management · Water-Energy-Food Nexus Studies
| Highly cited | No |
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