Hybrid theory of corporate legal personhood and its application to artificial intelligence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22229283 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Siina Raskulla (0000-0001-6211-5899, Tampere University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Publication date | 2023-05-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | SN Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2662-9283 • E-ISSN: 2662-9283 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s43545-023-00667-x |
| OpenAlex | W4382630382 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 47 |
Artificial intelligence (AI) is often compared to corporations in legal studies when discussing AI legal personhood. This article also uses this analogy between AI and companies to study AI legal personhood but contributes to the discussion by utilizing the hybrid model of corporate legal personhood. The hybrid model simultaneously applies the real entity, aggregate entity, and artificial entity models. This article adopts a legalistic position, in which anything can be a legal person. However, there might be strong pragmatic reasons not to confer legal personhood on non-human entities. The article recognizes that artificial intelligence is autonomous by definition and has greater de facto autonomy than corporations and, consequently, greater potential for de jure autonomy. Therefore, AI has a strong attribute to be a real entity. Nevertheless, the article argues that AI has key characteristics from the aggregate entity and artificial entity models. Therefore, the hybrid entity model is more applicable to AI legal personhood than any single model alone. The discussion recognises that AI might be too autonomous for legal personhood. Still, it concludes that the hybrid model is a useful analytical framework as it incorporates legal persons with different levels of de jure and de facto autonomy
Autonomy · De facto · Epistemology · Legal person · Personhood · Political science · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal principles and applications · Philosophy · Artificial Intelligence
A Theory of Legal Personhood
Artificial Intelligence and the Public Sector—Applications and Challenges
The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality
On the Morality of Artificial Agents
Minds, brains, and programs
Liability for AI
Non‐human consciousness and the specificity problem
Are superintelligent robots entitled to human rights
Legal personhood for artificial intelligence
Assessing contemporary legislative proposals for their compatibility with a natural law case for AI legal personhood
The intelligent machine
The problem of ascribing legal responsibility in the case of robotics
Toward a comparative theory of agents
The political choreography of the Sophia robot
Artificial moral and legal personhood
Debate
What do we owe to intelligent robots
In AI we trust? Perceptions about automated decision-making by artificial intelligence
Legal personhood for the integration of AI systems in the social context
Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence
Challenging Corporate Personhood Theory
Artificial Intelligence and the Limits of Legal Personality
The Company
Who are Law's Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects
Law as Information in the Era of Data-Driven Agency
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |