Unveiling the origins of non-performance-oriented behavior in China’s local governments

A game theory perspective on the performance-based promotion system

Bibliographic Data

ID22231995
AuthorsHuping Shang (0000-0003-2816-2717, University of Science and Technology of China), Hongmei Liu (0000-0003-1064-2448), Wei Liu (0000-0002-5949-0302), Liu We (0000-0001-6111-4149, Renmin University of China, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume11
Issue1
Publication date2024-05-13
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueHumanities and Social Sciences Communications (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2662-9992 • E-ISSN: 2662-9992
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1057/s41599-024-03106-1
OpenAlexW4396871458
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited73

Performance evaluation has great potential to encourage government officials to improve their behavior (performance-oriented government behavior, POGB), but it also tends to lead to behaviors that are detrimental to government performance (non-performance-oriented government behavior, NPOGB). The latter behaviors are prevalent in many parts of the world, especially in areas with fiscal federalist characteristics such as China. This study analyzes POGB and NPOGB and employs game theory to develop a theoretical model to explain the causes of NPOGBs in China, exploring how competition among different jurisdictions leads to them. The findings show that (1) POGB is a condition of Pareto optimality in government behavior, but only represents a very small share of all government behaviors. The majority of behaviors can be categorized as NPOGBs. (2) The primary reason continuous and volatile NPOGBs persist is that, from the perspective of local officials operating under the constraints of information scarcity and risk aversion, they are rational choices, and officials have to imitate one another’s behaviors so as not to be defeated in the competition with others

Business · China · Economic system · Economics · Game theory · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Computer Science · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Taxation and Compliance Studies · Artificial Intelligence

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