Naturaleza del deseo intelectivo en Aristóteles

Bibliographic Data

ID22260488
AuthorsMarjolein Bosch (0000-0002-9292-6964, Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume2
Issue1
Pages11-34
Publication date2022-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRevista Internacional de Filosofía Teórica y Práctica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2745-0333 • E-ISSN: 2745-0333
PublisherEditic (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.51660/riftp.v2i1.40
OpenAlexW4206064268
LanguageES
References cited18

This article analyses and reclaims the concept of intellective desire in Aristotle’s work. It is a concept that includes the different kinds of desire linked to reason and, therefore, belonging to the “theoretical soul” (theoretike psyqué). This is a neglected topic since Kant determined the exclusive legitimacy of reason for morality. In poskantian times is really hard to recognize the original prominence of desire in Aristotle’s thought, since the Kantian tradition in which we are immerse, our reading along the XX century was focussed on the reason and its imperatives. The Nicomachean Ethics allows a new comprehension of the intellective desire when we assume its priority. A eudemonist ethics is, necessarily, an Ethics of desire and happiness is its height. To elaborate this analysis we explore, at the beginning, the existent discussion about the Aristotelian intellectualism. Secondly, the key elements that show the importance of desire in Aristotelian Ethics are exposed. Third, we argue that the general assumption about a conflict between reason and desire in the Aristotelian thought is false: The true conflict takes place between two different kind of desire. The fifth section explains the meaning of willing (boulesis) as a desire (orexis) of the good and, finally, choice (proairesis) is studied in its desiring dimension

Art · Humanities · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Education and Teacher Training · Philosophy · Social Issues and Policies in Latin America

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