From Human Rights to Fundamental Rights
Consequences of a conceptual distinction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22286583 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gianluigi Palombella (0000-0001-8646-5316, Professor of Legal Philosophy, Head of Department “Studi Giuridici e Sociali”, Via dell’Università 12, PARMA (Italy)) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 93 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 396-426 |
| Publication date | 2007-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0177-1108 • E-ISSN: 2363-5606 |
| Publisher | Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft mbH (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.25162/arsp-2007-0027 |
| OpenAlex | W1039018835 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
This article introduces a peculiar distinction between “human” rights and “fundamental” rights, explaining through diverse areas, the role that the difference can play. Rights are loaded with contrasting properties and burdens, opposing features and values (neutral, pre-political, negotiable, democratic, etc.). On the contrary, we should accept -on one side- human rights as moral visions of what is due to human beings, deontological imperatives, even if abstract. But on the other side we cannot ignore the ethical problems: e.g. those resulting from their blind implementation. We need to enhance the institutional, legal and ethical-political meaning of “fundamental” rights, i.e. those which are assigned a meta-normative role in a legal order, and an ultimate value in the corresponding social and ethical context. The article shows also how the use of these definitions can clear some theoretical misunderstandings, improve our critical analysis and help in explanation of real processes
Business · Fundamental rights · Human rights · International human rights law · Law and economics · Political science · Reservation of rights · Right to property · Rights of Nature · Sociology · Human Rights and Development · Law
| Citations per year | 0.11 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2017 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |