Peirce et Wittgenstein face au défi sceptique
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22313147 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Claudine Tiercelin (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 13-28 |
| Publication date | 2010-12-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | PARADIGMI (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1120-3404 • E-ISSN: 2035-357X |
| Publisher | Franco Angeli (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.3280/para2010-003002 |
| OpenAlex | W1504790701 |
| Language | FR |
| Citations received | 3 |
Peirce e Wittgenstein mostrano che il dubbio, come la credenza, ha bisogno di ragioni. Entrambi sviluppano le loro critiche al dubbio radicale secondo una prospettiva pragmatista, ma danno risposte diverse: Wittgenstein ondeggia tra una reazione realista e una pirronista, mentre Peirce sostiene una versione scientifica e metafisica del realismo e della filosofia del senso comune, rimanendo tuttavia cosi critico e fallibilista da tenersi solo a un passo dallo scetticismo. L’intento dell’articolo e di mostrare la varieta delle risposte pragmatiste alla sfida scettica e la superiorita della prospettiva peirceana. Peirce and Wittgenstein have shown that doubt, as much as belief, needs reasons. Both have close pragmatist views in their criticism of radical doubt, but have different answers. Whereas Wittgenstein wavers between a realistic and neo-pyrrhonian reaction, Peirce relies on a scientific and metaphysical version of realism and common sensism, yet remains so critical and fallibilistic that he keeps close to skepticism. The aim of the paper is to show the variety of the pragmatist parries to the skeptical challenge and the superiority of Peirce’s approach
Linguistics · Historical Linguistics and Language Studies · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |