El enigma de Kripke

In this article, as its title says, I present a formal solution in the intensional line to Kripke’s paradoxes on belief. I analize and formalize the main three cases he expounds, about Tully-Cicero, Paderewski and Londres-London, according to his principles and presuppositions in one version, I think, developing my solution to each case in another. My idea is that if Kripke’s principles and presuppositions lead to paradoxical ascriptions of belief in these cases, that is enough to suspect that they cannot have the non-restrictive application Kripke thinks they have. My solution to those paradoxes fundamentally presupposes the following facts (or at least I think it does): (i) the existence of idiolects; (ii) the existence of dispositions to substitution of expressions inside the sentences that subjects assent to, which are able to show the idiosyncratic understanding of certain expressions possessed by some subjects in some cases; and (iii) with respect to the “meaning” of proper names, that it is only necessary to take into account their idiosyncratic reference and the mentioned dispositions. (i)–(iii) allow us to see a solution to the paradoxes intermediate between Fregean solutions and Russellian ones, as it does not presuppose so much as the Fregean notion of sense nor so little as the Kripkean thesis that the meaning of names is just their reference

Epistemology · Linguistics · Presupposition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science