Two Dogmas of Structural Realism. A Confirmation of a Philosophical Death Foretold
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22329332 |
|---|---|
| Authors | ANDRES RIVADULLA (0000-0001-5773-7474, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 124 |
| Publication date | 2010-01-07 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Critica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0011-1503 • E-ISSN: 1870-4905 |
| Publisher | Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (PUBLISHER • MX) |
| DOI | 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2010.890 |
| OpenAlex | W2185014526 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
Twenty years ago John Worrall offered an alleged non-standard viable form of scientific realism under the name structural realism. Structural realism was supposed to be both an alternative to standard scientific realism and viable form of realism. The central questions addressed in this paper are what I call the two dogmas of structural realism: the idea that there is structure retention across theory change, and the idea that theoretical structures describe the world. Arthur Fine proclaimed that scientific realism was dead. I claim that Worrall’s attempt to bring scientific realism back to life has failed
Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Philosophical realism · Realism · Scientific realism · Scientific theory · History of Science and Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Science and Climate Studies
| Highly cited | No |
|---|