Sometimes Some Things Don’t (Really) Exist
Pragmatic Meinongism and the Referential Sub-Problem of Negative Existentials
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22329486 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lenny Clapp (0000-0002-6753-9540, Northern Illinois University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 154 |
| Publication date | 2020-09-30 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Critica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0011-1503 • E-ISSN: 1870-4905 |
| Publisher | Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (PUBLISHER • MX) |
| DOI | 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1176 |
| OpenAlex | W3090891068 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 25 |
To solve the referential sub-problem of negative existentials one must explain why we interpret uses of, e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ as saying something coherent and intuitively true, even though the speaker purports to refer to something. Pragmatic Meinongism solves this problem by allowing ‘does not exist’ to be pragmatically modulated to express an inclusive sense under which it can be satisfied by something. I establish three points in defense of pragmatic Meinongism: (i) it is superior to Russell-inspired solutions; (ii) it is supported by independent evidence of pragmatic modulation; and (iii) it requires no dubious ontological commitments
Epistemology · Linguistics · Pragmatics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Reference and Existence
Truth-Conditional Pragmatics
Towards Non-Being
Thoughts and Utterances
On What Grounds What
Ii.—on Denoting
What is Existence?
Metametaphysics
Existence, Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Entities
Existence predicates
Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects
Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |