Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Is Language Necessary for Acquiring Conceptual Capabilities

Bibliographic Data

ID22329680
AuthorsErik Nelson (0000-0002-3228-1164, York University, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume58
Issue172
Pages15-44
Publication date2026-05-09
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCritica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0011-1503 • E-ISSN: 1870-4905
PublisherUniversidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (PUBLISHER • MX)
DOI10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2026.1782
OpenAlexW7160921752
LanguageEN
References cited55

Normative conceptual holists have argued that conceptual capabilities can only be acquired through language. The a priori nature of their argument means that, if it is correct, not only is it a mistake for scientists to attribute conceptual capabilities to nonlinguistic animals, but also a mistake to think that empirical results have any bearing on such a claim. I argue that the absurd conclusion that concept acquisition is impossible can be derived from the claims that motivate this argument. Normative conceptual holists can avoid this result, but only by giving up the claim that linguistic and conceptual capabilities are necessarily linked. It follows that it is an open and empirical question whether nonlinguistic animals have conceptual capabilities

A priori and a posteriori · Conceptual framework · Conceptual history · Conceptual model · Conceptual system · Mistake · Normative · Categorization, perception, and language · Child and Animal Learning Development · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

  • From Empiricism to Expressivism

    Robert B Brandom, Robert Brandom•From Empiricism to Expressivism•2015

  • Cultural innovation and transmission of tool use in wild chimpanzees

    Open Access•David Biro, Dora Biro et al.•Animal Cognition•2003

  • On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme

    Donald Davidson•Proceedings and Addresses of the…•1973

  • Reading Brandom

    Bernhard Weiss, Jeremy Wanderer•Reading Brandom•2010

  • Mind and World

    Open Access•John Mcdowell•Mind and World•1996

  • A Forward-Looking Theory of Content

    Open Access•Cameron Buckner•Ergo an Open Access Journal of…•2022

  • Transitive Inference over Affective Representations in Non-Human Animals

    Open Access•Sanja Srećković•Review of Philosophy and Psychology•2024

  • Shared Intentionality in Nonhuman Great Apes

    Open Access•Dennis Papadopoulos•Review of Philosophy and Psychology•2023

  • Gendering animals

    Open Access•LETITIA MEYNELL, Andrew Lopez•Synthese•2021

  • A Sellarsian argument for nonlinguistic conceptual capabilities

    Open Access•Erik Nelson•Synthese•2024

  • Heterogeneous inferences with maps

    Open Access•Megan Aguilera•Synthese•2021

  • Predication and cartographic representation

    Open Access•Michael Rescorla•Synthese•2009

  • Animal Culture and Animal Welfare

    Open Access•Simon Fitzpatrick, Kristin Andrews•Philosophy of Science•2022

  • Emergent moral non‐naturalism

    Open Access•Umut Baysan•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2025

  • Mental Maps 1

    Open Access•Ben Blumson•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2011

  • Brandom Beleaguered

    Open Access•Jerry A Fodor, Jerry Fodor et al.•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2007

  • Autonomy as Second Nature

    David Forman•Inquiry•2008

  • Articulating Reasons

    Open Access•Robert B Brandom, Robert Brandom•Articulating Reasons•2009

  • The Content of Perceptual Experience

    John Mcdowell•The Philosophical Quarterly•1994

  • Are Humans the Only Rational Animals

    Open Access•Giacomo Melis, Susana Monsó•The Philosophical Quarterly•2024

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae