Vindicating Chance
On The Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22330002 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ramiro Caso (0000-0002-1421-2739, Universidad de Buenos Aires, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 142 |
| Pages | 3-33 |
| Publication date | 2016-10-31 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Critica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0011-1503 • E-ISSN: 1870-4905 |
| Publisher | Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (PUBLISHER • MX) |
| DOI | 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2016.234 |
| OpenAlex | W2189115823 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of chance is presented, and the dialectical burdens acquired by each side of the debate are identified: the motivation problem and the explanation problem. It is argued that, while the motivation problem presents no challenge to non-reductionists, reductionists are unable successfully to answer it. Contrary to what has been suggested, both sides share the burden of the explanation problem. It is argued that non- eductionists can successfully answer it, whereas reductionists are unable to make the corresponding claim. Hence, the non-reductionist side has an important dialectical advantage
Dialectic · Epistemology · Reductionism · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Correcting The Guide to Objective Chance
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance
New work for a theory of universals
Indeterminist time and truth‐value gaps 1
Vagueness, truth and logic
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle
On Confusions About Bivalence and Excluded Middle
On What We Know About Chance
Future Contingents and Relative Truth
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |