First Person Authority and Knowledge of One’s Own Actions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22330026 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Martín Francisco Fricke (0000-0001-8146-0954, National Quemoy University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 134 |
| Pages | 3-16 |
| Publication date | 2013-12-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Critica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0011-1503 • E-ISSN: 1870-4905 |
| Publisher | Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (PUBLISHER • MX) |
| DOI | 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2013.688 |
| OpenAlex | W2156918806 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 3 |
What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one’s own actions? On one view, it is because we know the reasons for which we act that we know what we do and, analogously, it is because we know the reasons for which we avow a belief that we know what we believe. Carlos Moya (2006) attributes some such theory to Richard Moran (2001) and criticises it on the grounds of circularity. In this paper, I examine the view attributed to Moran. I rebut the charge of circularity, but also reject the theory as an adequate interpretation of Moran
Epistemology · Linguistics · Need to know · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Artificial Intelligence
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |