Philosophy and Disagreement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22330078 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brian Ribeiro (University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 127 |
| Pages | 3-25 |
| Publication date | 2011-12-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Critica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0011-1503 • E-ISSN: 1870-4905 |
| Publisher | Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (PUBLISHER • MX) |
| DOI | 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2011.850 |
| OpenAlex | W1589066214 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 2 |
Disagreement as we find it in both the history and the contemporary practice of philosophy is an inadequately understood phenomenon. In this paper I outline and motivate the problem of disagreement, arguing that “hard cases” of disagreement confront us with an unresolved, and seemingly unresolvable, challenge to the rationality of philosophical discourse, thereby raising the specter of a worrisome form of metaphilosophical skepticism. A variety of responses and attempted evasions are considered, though none are found to be particularly satisfying: Thus, the specter remains unexorcised
Epistemology · Metaphilosophy · Modern philosophy · Phenomenon · Rationality · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2022 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |