A Reply to Céspedes’ Defense of Causal Contrastivism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22330152 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (0000-0002-5023-3449, Aarhus University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 143 |
| Pages | 93-98 |
| Publication date | 2016-10-31 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Critica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0011-1503 • E-ISSN: 1870-4905 |
| Publisher | Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (PUBLISHER • MX) |
| DOI | 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2016.227 |
| OpenAlex | W2594825389 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 2 |
In a recent article in this journal, Esteban Céspedes (2015) seeks to defend the contrastive account of singular causation from my criticisms (Steglich-Petersen 2012). Céspedes objects to my argument on three counts: (1) it is circular in presupposing a principle that it seeks to establish; (2) that same principle is false; and (3) even if the principle were true, it would not speak against the contrastive account. In this note I argue that all three objections are unconvincing
Causation · Epistemology · Political science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
|---|