The limits of naturalism
Husserl’s structured critique
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22334797 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Muzzamel Hussain Imran (0000-0001-8141-6654, Tongji University), Xin Leng (0009-0000-8046-4275, Tongji University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-14 |
| Publication date | 2026-04-13 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal for the Study of Spirituality (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2044-0243 • E-ISSN: 2044-0251 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/20440243.2026.2654483 |
| OpenAlex | W7154079932 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
This article aims to explore Husserl’s critique of naturalism, focusing particularly on its transcendental aspect. Husserl argues that naturalism is ‘counterintuitive’ because it rejects the ideal laws necessary for its own justification. He contends that naturalism fundamentally misunderstands consciousness by treating it as just another element of the world. The analysis of Husserl’s work seeks to clarify and articulate the nature of his critique as a structured argument. It is concluded that this argument effectively highlights naturalism’s reliance on narrow interpretations of human experience and diminishes the overall case for naturalism
Metatheory · Spirituality · Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity · Humanities and Social Sciences · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
|---|