Special Relationship in the Malay World

Reviewed by: Special Relationship in the Malay World: Indonesia and Malaysia by Ho Ying Chan Anton O. Zakharov Special Relationship in the Malay World: Indonesia and Malaysia Ho Ying Chan Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018, xix, 431 pp. Indonesia–Malaysia bilateral relations form the cradle of Southeast Asian international relations. The two biggest nations of the Malay World have a long and unique history of partnership and rivalry, cooperation and quarrel, contested legacies and common origins. Their relations have always been special in a broad sense of the word. Since 1957 Indonesia has faced the Malayan Federation as another influential nation in the Malay World displaying the Malay way of life. Nowadays Indonesia and Malaysia both play pivotal roles in ASEAN—the association co-founded by them in 1967 together with another three Southeast Asian nations to promote regional cooperation in sociocultural, economic, and political spheres within the region. In contemporary political science and international relations, the concept of special relationship has obtained a narrower, more specific sense. It denotes the bilateral relations between the two states who share strategic interests and common cultural values and/or common origin. Special relationships exist between the USA and Canada, the USA and Great Britain, the USA and Israel, and between some other countries on the globe. Dr Ho Ying Chan offers a comprehensive overview of special relationships focusing on two main points. First, he examines the 'Theoretical Framework of a Special Relationship' in Part 1. Second, he elucidates the thorny path of Indonesia and Malaysia to their special relationship and shows current challenges to their specific interrelations. Chapter 1: Introduction outlines Ho's key hypothesis that a special relationship provides a security regime and brings cooperation as well as conflicts between the two states involved. The special relationship may produce a 'pluralistic security community' (p. 4) but it is not necessary. Part 1: Theoretical Framework of a Special Relationship deals with Southeast Asia indirectly. It focuses on theoretical concepts of special relationship, security community and its pluralistic form. Chapter 2: Making Sense of a Special Relationship shows the fundamental prerequisites of such relations—common identities and shared strategic interests that gave birth to the special relationship of the USA and Great Britain in their promotion of liberalism and capitalist economy throughout the globe. Ho shares Karl W. Deutsch's idea that 'the material capabilities and the compatibility of major values of the states involved play vital roles in forging a pluralistic security community between them' (p. 48). [End Page 120] Chapter 3: The Conceptual Framework for a Special Relationship focuses on the state power, identities, expectations and norms as factors in developing a special relationship. Ho asserts that power is 'the material capacity of a state' and that 'a state's wealth can be measured in terms of its GDP per capita' (p. 59). But this indicator is only relative, because the state's GDP per capita shows the average wealth of its citizens, but not its military power. Ho refers to India and Switzerland and points out that the former is 'less wealthy' than the latter (p. 59). But India's military power, human resources, the size of its population and territory, natural resources and economic strength are obviously greater than those of Switzerland. Ho emphasizes that the balance of power may lead to power competition and may be a basis of order in bilateral state relations. Power competition may also produce a relative order, such as the India–China relations or Franco–German relations in the last decades of the nineteenth century (pp. 67–71). But international relations depend on a more complicated set of factors. The German threat to France after the Franco–Prussian War was balanced by Russia's policies: the Tsarist government aimed to prevent considerable growth of the German Empire and serious weakening of the Third Republic. In fact, European countries wanted counterbalancing of power to secure their own power positions. Ho rightly believes that imbalance of power may cause war or peace, depending on space and times. He cited two cases when power imbalance lead to war: the China–Vietnam War and the USSR–Finland 'Winter War' (pp. 73–6). Ho also points out

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