Dados Bibliográficos

AUTOR(ES) B. Volker , Klarita Gërxhani , Jacqueline van Breemen
AFILIAÇÃO(ÕES) Departement of Sociology, Utrecht University, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Amsterdam UMC - University of Amsterdam
ANO 2021
TIPO Artigo
PERIÓDICO European Sociological Review
ISSN 0266-7215
E-ISSN 1468-2672
EDITORA Routledge (United Kingdom)
DOI 10.1093/esr/jcaa062
ADICIONADO EM 2025-08-18

Resumo

We study whether and when a second-order collective action problem, like the change of existing formal rules governing cooperation, can be resolved to ultimately solve first-order collective good dilemmas. We do so by examining the conditions under which individuals change cooperation rules when both their material incentives to cooperate and their social preferences for outcome distributions differ. Our experimental findings show that proselfs who benefit the most from cooperation are most likely to initiate a rule change to a higher minimum contribution level. Regarding prosocials, we find that their underlying motives in favour or against this rule change vary depending on their relative earnings' position. If they are 'wealthy', that is, they have a higher earnings potential, they are more concerned about equality. When they are relatively 'less wealthy', they seem to care more about enhancing collective outcomes.

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