Bhartṛhari on the Reflexivity of Cognition and Self-reference

The Indian philosopher-grammarian Bhartṛhari, in his treatise “Vākyapadīya” (VP), often addresses problems of epistemology – typically resorting to them to illustrate his linguistic views. Among such problems is the issue of self-knowledge, or the reflexivity of cognitive acts. Bhartṛhari discusses the reflexi­vity of cognition three times in the text, and in two of these instances, he does so in connection with the problem of self-reference, apparently considering the problems of self-reference and the reflexivity of cognition to be typologically similar. Bhartṛhari’s position regarding the reflexivity of cognition is not entirely consistent. In the VP 1.51, while justifying the doctrine of self-reference, he explicitly states that every act of cognition is reflexive. In the VP 3.1.105-110, discussing the doctrine of universals, he notes that one act of cognition cannot be the object of another act of cognition. In the VP 3.3.22-24, the self-referential nature of certain paradoxical statements is denied, as is the reflexivity of such cognitive situations as doubt (saṃśaya) and decision-making (nirṇaya). Generally, a positive resolution to the problems of self-reference and the reflexivity of cognition aligns better with the overall context of Bhartrihari’s philosophy. However, situationally, Bhartrihari offers negative or “weak” formulations, which may be explained by his desire to avoid paradoxes and the potential reduction of his arguments to a regressus ad infinitum by his opponents.

Cognition · Context (archaeology) · Doctrine · Object (grammar) · Reflexivity · Situated cognition · Historical Linguistics and Language Studies · Indian and Buddhist Studies · Indian History and Philosophy