On policy responsiveness
Conditions for effective demand and supply
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22413385 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Wlezien (0000-0002-0719-697X, The University of Texas at Austin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 189-222 |
| Publication date | 2026-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0143-814X • E-ISSN: 1469-7815 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0143814x26101019 |
| OpenAlex | W7167799537 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 175 |
A massive amount of research examines the representation of public opinion by policymakers, increasingly on actual policy actions. The work often provides evidence of a positive association between expressed public preferences and policy, but only some of the time and only to some degree, and there is even less evidence of responsiveness. This essay delves into the conditions for responsiveness, focusing on public demand for policy and policy supply, building on what research on the subjects reveals. The examination makes clear that policy responsiveness requires a great deal of both the represented and the representatives (and scholars too) and that these conditions are not easily met, though sometimes are. The emergent structure seemingly is much as empirical democratic theory would predict, and helps account for patterns of policy “responsiveness” we observe. The concluding section contemplates future research.
Democracy · Empirical evidence · Public policy · Representation (politics) · Section (typography) · Supply and demand · Work (physics) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Policy Transfer and Learning · Social Policy and Reform Studies
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The Party Decides
Lobbying and Policy Change
The Submerged State
Representing the Advantaged
The Rational Public
Why Parties?
A Unified Theory of Party Competition
The Timeline of Presidential Elections
The Politics of Competence
Negativity in Democratic Politics
Organizing Democratic Choice
The American Voter Revisited
Mandates and Democracy
Consistency between Public Preferences and National Policy Decisions
Veto Players
Frustrated Majorities
Democracy Defended
Why Welfare States Persist
Measuring the Countermajoritarian Nature of Supreme Court Decisions
The Oxford Handbook of Political Representation in Liberal Democracies
How News Coverage of Misinformation Shapes Perceptions and Trust
Response strategies for coping with the cognitive demands of attitude measures in surveys
Democracy for Realists
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The American Political Economy
Losers' Consent
Economic Inequality and Political Responsiveness
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |