The motor finance litigation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22414490 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Derek Whayman (0000-0003-1026-5646, University of Reading, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-6 |
| Publication date | 2026-07-14 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legal Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0261-3875 • E-ISSN: 1748-121X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/lst.2026.10141 |
| OpenAlex | W7168291675 |
| Language | EN |
The agency problem describes the information asymmetry where the agent knows more than the principal, who accordingly is vulnerable to the agent taking advantage. It is the central issue in the motor finance litigation, where the basic facts are that a consumer buys a car on credit from a dealer who takes a secret commission from the lender or hides other salient facts from the buyer.
Commission · Information asymmetry · Principal–agent problem · Salient · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Law, logistics, and international trade · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Highly cited | No |
|---|