Statebound Rationality and the Ontological Limits of Wakeful Epistemology in advance

Contemporary philosophy often equates rationality with wakeful cognition, tacitly assuming the ontological homogeneity of the cognizing subject. This article challenges this by arguing that epistemology is structurally dependent upon the ontological state of actualized cognition. Drawing on classical metaphysics, Neoplatonism, and contemporary resources, the paper advances three claims. First, epistemology presupposes an ontological unity of the subject that lacks an internal epistemological ground. Second, human existence unfolds across distinct ontological states—notably wakefulness and sleep—each configuring rational awareness through different modes of participation. Third, sleep discloses an ordered, non-sensory rationality, indicating that reason is neither exhausted by sensory mediation nor reducible to discursive articulation. Consequently, Kantian critical limits are reinterpreted as conditionally accurate accounts of wakeful cognition rather than universal boundaries of reason. Situated within their ontological horizon, these limits emerge as state-bound judgments. The article concludes by defending “ontological humility,” preserving systematic metaphysical inquiry despite epistemology’s state-conditioned character.

Mediation · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Rationality · Situated · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science